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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction to hear this matter pursuant to Utah Code Annotated
section 78-2-2.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF
REVIEW
May a trial Court issue a permanent protective order based upon the assertion of
the Plaintiff that she is afraid of the Defendant. This after the following question by that
Court; "You're afraid of him?" (Transcript of hearing January 22, 2004 page 5 line 11).
May a trial Court issue a permanent protective order where the Defendant nor his
witnesses are permitted to testify? Riggins v. District Court of Salt Lake County. 51 P.2d
645 Utah 1935 and Pangea Technologies. Inc. v. Internet Promotions. Inc. 2004 WL
1092239 Utah,2004 May 18, 2004.
May a trial Court issue a permanent protective order where the Defendant was not
served with the ex-parte protective order but came to court voluntarily after learning from
another source that a hearing was on the Court docket? Riggins v. District Court of Salt
Lake County. 51 P.2d 645 Utah 1935, Article I section 7 Utah Constitution.
May a trial Court deprive a Defendant of the right to keep and bear arms through
the issuance of a permanent protective order without due process of law?
The standard of review is for correctness for the standards for issuing a permanent

protective order. The standard of review for a taking without due process of law is
correctness.
Whether the trial court selected the correct legal definition to apply to the facts of
a case presents a question of law. See C & Y Corp. v. General Biometrics, Inc., 896 P.2d
47, 54 (Utah Ct.App.1995). Legal correctness Morse v. Packer, 973 P.2d 422 Utah, 1999.
Correctness (of the statute) under article 1 section 11 Wood v. University of Utah Medical
Center, 67 P.3d 436 Utah,2002.

APPLICABLE STATUTES AND RULES
Constitution of Utah Article 1 section 7 due process of law, Constitution of Utah
Article 1 section 11 requires that the Courts be open to the Defendant. Utah Code
Annotated sections 30-6-et seq domestic violence. The Constitution requires due process
of law for the taking of life liberty and property. The Court shall consider factors in
making a protective order permanent, Utah code Annotated section 30-6-et seq, and
USCS 18 Section 922 (for reference).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The trial Court herein issued a permanent protective order upon the representation
by the Plaintiff that she was afraid of the Defendant. This despite the request by the
Defendant to be allowed to call witnesses to testify, that the event that the Plaintiff wrote
in her ex-parte request for the issuance of a protective order, did not occur. As a result of
the issuance of a permanent protective order, Kerri Fairer is not permitted to possess a
firearm or go hunting, something that he has enjoyed.
FACTS

The parties had h<vn man toil, ihey have a two year old child together. The piiidrv.
divorce was final on or about September 5, 200't 1 \w | Vkiulant, Kerry Farrer has
remarried, iiir PI.nniil]'sought and was granted an ex-parte protective order a>>ninsi fin
defendant i he Defendant was m^ t- .

ie ex-parte protective order, The

. J_ iiovi oi ihe hearing to make the protective K .*.

partj \\ho rouund

-

•

nu, -:. *

\«/iliIi' t mime cow t docket.

Kerry Farrer appeared with counsel at t

order hearing. There he

brought two witnesses. Through counsel he asserted that the statemei the Verified Petition for Protective <

> *

J

*. \K fendant requested that the

J.-. LCbimiony the Defendant and his witnesses.

-tened to a

recitation of events by f !»•• l^uitfil], asked he, a sue was afraid of the Defendant,
(1 lanscript of the hearing pages 4 and 5) and the • • •i L a \ ; . AUTHOF

v

-

iotective order was granted.

AND I )ISCl 'SSiON

CONSTITUTION O! LlAHAKiiCLi
- ,
OF RIGHT"
55 1 H (Mirts ope- Redress of injuries. j
Mi ^mrt* shall i'-i open, and every person, for an («:ju,; done to ftim in Ms person,
property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which shall be
administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred from
prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in,, this State, by himself or counsel, any civil
cause to which he is a party.
Riggins v. District Court of Salt Lake County., 51 P.2d 645 Utah 1.935 reads in part
.." Due process of law requncs thai woi^c «. . A to the persons whose rights are
:
to be affected. It "hears before it condemns, procee f
' enders judgment
only after trial." It is difficult to believe that the Le
npower the court
to find "that the material allegations of the petition or con
without giving
*:K- defendant an opportunity to be heard. It is elementary mat a court may not make
ings binding upon a defendant without a hearing, or an opportunity to be heard. An act
h
authorized a court to make findings binding upon, a defendant without giving him. an
;t\ :. be heard must fail.

Affirmatively cited for this proposition in, Pangea Technologies, Inc. v. Internet
Promotions, Inc. 2004 WL 1092239 Utah,2004 May 18, 2004.
Despite his request to be heard (transcript of hearing page 2 lines 22-25 through page 3
line 6 and page 5 line 25 through page 6 line3). Mr. Farrer nor his witnesses were
permitted to testify, nor present any evidence.
Without any due process Mr. Fairer's opportunity to hunt, to posses anyfirearmis
taken from him, and he becomes subject to state and federal firearms violations if he ever
does. 18 USCS section 922 provides that it is unlawful for anyone who is subject to a
court order restraining himfrom"harassing, stalking, or threatening ..."frompossessing
afirearmor even ammunition. He is precluded from obtaining a concealed weapons
license under Utah Code Annotated section 53-5-704
Further, Mr. Farrer had never been served with the ex-parte order nor notice of
hearing. Utah Constitution Article I section 7 provides: "No person shall be deprived of
Life, liberty or property without due process of law."
The entire reason for the issuance of the protective order is found on page 5 lines
22-25 where it reads "The Court: Well, Fm going to make this order permanent because
she's - she says she's afraid of him and she doesn't want him to come to her house or
bother her."
A restraining order would more appropriately address "she doesn't want him to
come to her house and bother her".
The protective order statutes are broad by design. Yet they requirefindingsof fact
that meet the sufficiency of the Utah Code, thosefindingsare not found in this case.
Mr. Farrer also challenges the constitutionality of the broad sweep of those

statutes. If all that is required for the issuance of a permanent protective order is an
affirmative answer by the Plaintiff, to a question by the Court, then the statute is
overbroad and should be reviewed for correctness under Article 1 section 11 of the
Constitution of the State of Utah. See Wood v. University of Utah Medical Center, 67
P.3d 436 Utah,2002. The Court asked "Your afraid of him?" (Transcript page 5 line 11).
She answered "Yeah" (page 5 line 12). Then added "He can't control his temper" (page 5
line 12). No offer of proof, no foundation, no opportunity for the Defendant to be heard.
In fact the Court stated the reason for the grant of the permanent protective order was:
"The Court: Well, I'm going to make this order permanent because she's - she says she's
afraid of him and she doesn't want him to come to her house or bother her." With that
statement Mr. Fairer's opportunity to hunt, to posses anyfirearmis takenfromhim.
CONCLUSION
The Appellant herein seeks a ruling from this Court setting aside the Permanent
Protective Order of the District Court. Direction to the District Courts on the standards
required to issue such broad reaching orders. Such other and further relief as is just and
appropriate.
Respectfully submitted this /£_ day of August, 2004.

Cleve Hatch/Attorney for
the Defendant/Appellant
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Brief of Appellant,
upon the Plaintiff/Appellee by placing two true and correct copies thereof in an envelope

addressed to Carrie Swasey, 400 East 600
August, 2004.
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Supreme Court of Utah.
PANGEA TECHNOLOGIES, INC., Plaintiff and
Appellee,
v.
INTERNET PROMOTIONS, INC., Defendant.
Zions First National Bank, Garnishee and Appellant.
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». 3, 2004 UT 40

garnishment, was liable for improper release of
funds to debtor constituted "new matter" for which
bank was entitled to evidentiary hearing on merits,
under rule requiring that new matters shall be tried
in same manner as other issues, since bank was not
placed on notice that creditor was seeking judgment
against bank during underlying action on debt.
Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 64D(i).

No. 20020445.
May 18,2004.
Background: Judgment creditor brought claim
against debtor's bank as garnishee, based on bank's
allegedly improper release of funds from debtor's
accounts that were subject to writ of garnishment.
The Third District Court, Salt Lake Department,
Leon A. Dever, J., entered judgment without
hearing in favor of creditor, and garnishee appealed.
Holding: The
that bank was
creditor's claim
funds subject to

Supreme Court, Nehring, J., held
entitled to evidentiary hearing on
that bank was liable for release of
garnishment.

Reversed and remanded.

[1] Appeal and Error €=*842(1)

[3] Constitutional Law €=>312(2)
92k312(2) Most Cited Cases
A garnishee is a stranger to the principal case
between a creditor and debtor and is an involuntary
participant in the garnishment proceeding, and thus,
such structural circumstance imposes unique due
process demands on the garnishment procedures,
especially in cases where the creditor seeks to
obtain a judgment from the garnishee. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 14; Const. Art. 1, § 7.
[4] Constitutional Law €=>251.6
92k251.6 Most Cited Cases
Fundamental features of due process require that
notice be given to the person whose rights are to be
affected; it hears before it condemns, proceeds upon
inquiry, and renders judgment only after trial.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14; Const. Art. 1, § 7.
Craig A. Hoggan, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff.
David M. McGrath, Robert A. Goodman, Salt Lake
City, for garnishee.

30k842(l) Most Cited Cases
The interpretation of a procedural rule is a legal
issue which the Supreme Court reviews anew
without
deference
to the district
court's
interpretation.
[2] Garnishment € = 1 5 8
189kl58 Most Cited Cases
[2] Garnishment €=>166.1
189k 166.1 Most Cited Cases
Judgment creditor's post-judgment claim that bank,
as holder of judgment debtor's funds subject to
Copr. © West 2004 No (

NEHRING, Justice:
*1 \ 1 This appeal presents us with the question
of whether a garnishee is entitled to a hearing after
the plaintiff in the principal case replies to the
garnishee's answers to interrogatories and seeks to
have the garnishee held liable to the plaintiff for the
property sought to be garnished. We reverse the
district court's denial of a hearing to garnishee
Zions First National Bank and vacate the judgment
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works

tp://print.westlaw.com/delivery.html?dest==atp&dataid=AOOSSRnnnnnno

2004 WL 1092239
94 P.3d 257, 2004 WL 1092239 (Utah), 500 Utah Adv. Re -. 3, 2004 UT 40
(Cite as: 2004 WL 1092239 (Utah))
against Zions in favor of the plaintiff and judgment
creditor
in the
principal
action, Pangea
Technologies, Inc.

Page 2

interpretation. Dipoma v. McPhie, 2001 UT 61, %
8,29P.3dl225. [FN1]
ANALYSIS

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND
% 2 Pangea obtained a judgment against Internet
Promotions, Inc., for $65,641. Believing that Zions
held money belonging to Internet Promotions,
Pangea served Zions with a writ of garnishment. As
authorized by rule 64D of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, the writ ordered Zions to hold all money
in Internet Promotions' accounts up to the amount
of the judgment and instructed Zions to answer
interrogatories about funds held by the bank which
belonged to Internet Promotions. Zions answered
the interrogatories the next day, telling Pangea that
$10,089 remained in Internet Promotions' account.
T[ 3 However, before Zions froze the funds, they
were transferred to the personal account of Internet
Promotions' president. After discovering this, Zions
amended its interrogatory answers to disclose the
transfer. Pangea responded by filing a reply to
Zions1 amended answers as permitted by Utah Rule
of Civil Procedure 64D(i). Pangea asked the district
court to charge Zions with liability for the amount
of the transferred funds. Pangea also requested a
hearing on the issue of Zions' liability.
Tf 4 The district court granted the judgment against
Zions without conducting a hearing, finding that the
money had been "improperly releas[ed]." Zions
asked the district court to reconsider, citing
language in rule 64D(i) which, it contended,
mandated a hearing. The court denied Zions' motion
and entered judgment against Zions for $10,089, the
amount of the transferred money, and an additional
$2,370.30 in attorney fees and costs. The district
court did not disclose its reasons for awarding
attorney fees. Zions appealed.
[1] If 5 Zions' appeal is confined to the question of
whether the district court erred when it declined to
hear the merits of Pangea's claim that Zions was
liable for the transferred money. We do not address
whether Zions was, in fact, liable. So presented,
Zions' appeal concerns an interpretation of a rule of
procedure. This is a legal issue which we review
anew without deference to the district court's

[2] [3] T[ 6 The seizure of property by garnishment
is governed by rule 64D of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. Utah R. Civ. P. 64D(i). A garnishee is a
stranger to the principal case and an involuntary
participant in the garnishment proceeding. This
structural circumstance imposes unique due process
demands on garnishment procedures. The need for
heightened sensitivity to due process is particularly
evident where, as here, a plaintiff seeks to obtain a
judgment from a garnishee. We conclude that rule
64D(i) requires that a garnishee be afforded a
hearing before it can be found liable to a plaintiff
and have a judgment entered against it.
*2 If 7 Rule 64D(i) reads as follows:
The plaintiff or defendant may, within 10 days
after the service
of any answers
to
interrogatories, file and serve upon the garnishee
and the other party to the principal action a reply
to the whole or any part thereof and may also
allege any matters which would charge the
garnishee with liability except that all claims for
exemptions to garnishment or non-ownership of
property garnisheed shall be resolved under the
procedures as otherwise provided for in
Subdivision (h) herein. Such new matter in reply
shall be taken as denied and the matter thus at
issue shall be tried in the same manner as other
issues of like nature. Judgment shall be entered
upon the verdict or finding the same as if the
garnishee had answered according to such verdict
or finding.
Utah R. Civ. P. 64D(i) (emphasis added).
[4] ^f 8 Pangea defends the district court's
determination that Zions was not entitled to a
hearing on the grounds that its reply to Zions'
amended interrogatories contained no "new matter"
and thus did not trigger the need for a trial. We
disagree. The "new matter" raised in Pangea's reply
was its assertion that Zions was liable for the money
transferred out of Internet Promotions' account.
Pangea would have us narrowly read "new matter"
to include only new facts. This interpretation would
inevitably cause garnishees to be deprived of due
process as guaranteed by article I, section 7 of the

Copr. © West 2004 No Clai to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works
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2004 WL 1092239
94 P.3d 257, 2004 WL 1092239 (Utah), 500 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 2004 UT 40
(Cite as: 2004 WL 1092239 (Utah))
Utah Constitution. We long ago succinctly
summarized the fundamental features of due
process, observing that it "requires that notice be
given to the person whose rights are to be
affected. It hears before it condemns, proceeds
upon inquiry, and renders judgment only after
trial." Riggins v. Dist Court of Salt Lake County,
89 Utah 183, 51 P.2d 645, 660 (1935) (internal
quotation omitted).

Page 3

Because we reverse the district court on
the legal question presented, within which
the issue of attorney fees is subsumed, we
do not reach this question.
94 P.3d 257, 2004 WL 1092239 (Utah), 500 Utah
Adv. Rep. 3, 2004 UT 40
END OF DOCUMENT

H 9 Until Pangea claimed in its reply that Zions
was liable, Zions was not placed on notice that
Pangea was seeking a judgment against Zions. If
Pangea's reply is to square with due process, its
request to find Zions liable must be construed as a
"new matter," thereby entitling Zions to a trial "in
the same manner as other issues of like nature."
UtahR. Civ.P. 64D(i).
^ 10 We have previously held that a judgment
may not be taken against a garnishee who has not
been served with a reply to the garnishee
interrogatories. Remington Rand, Inc. v. O'Neil, 4
Utah 2d 270, 293 P.2d 416, 417 (1956) {Remington
I ) . When the Remington I litigants returned to this
court a year later, we reiterated our commitment to
the right of a garnishee to be heard before being at
risk of having a judgment entered against it, stating,
"the object of promoting justice requires that both
sides to [the] controversy have a fair opportunity to
present their claims on their merits. Otherwise, the
main purposes of our courts of justice and our
judicial system will be defeated." Remington Rand,
Inc. v. O'Neil, 6 Utah 2d 182, 309 P.2d 368, 370
(1957) (Remington II).
*3 K 11 The reasoning of Remington II remains
sound today. Accordingly, the district court's
issuance of a judgment against garnishee Zions,
absent a hearing, violated Zions' due process rights.
We therefore reverse the district court* and remand
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
1f 12 Chief Justice DURHAM, Associate Chief
Justice DURRANT, Justice WILKINS, and Justice
PARRISH concur in Justice NEHRING's opinion.

FN1. Zions also challenges the district
court's award of attorney fees to Pangea.
Copr. © West 2004 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works

ttp://print.westlaw.com/delivery.html?dest=atp&dataid=A005580noonncnoo

A A A AC\r^~~

-

ADDENDUM B

§ 922.

Unlawful acts

(a) It shall be unlawful—
(1) for any person—
(A) except a licensed importer, licensed manufacturer, or licensed
165

18 USCS § 922

CRIMES

& CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

dealer, to engage in the business of importing, manufacturing, or dealing in firearms, or in the course of such business to ship, transport, or
receive any firearm in interstate or foreign commerce; or
(B) except a licensed importer or licensed manufacturer, to engage in
the business of importing or manufacturing ammunition, or in the
course of such business, to ship, transport, or receive any ammunition
in interstate or foreign commerce;
(2) for any importer, manufacturer, dealer, or collector licensed under the
provisions of this chapter [18 USCS §§ 921 et seq.] to ship or transport
in interstate or foreign commerce any firearm to any person other than a
licensed importer, licensed manufacturer, licensed dealer, or licensed collector, except that—
(A) this paragraph and subsection (b)(3) shall not be held to preclude
a licensed importer, licensed manufacturer, licensed dealer, or licensed
collector from returning a firearm or replacement firearm of the same
kind and type to a person from whom it was received; and this
paragraph shall not be held to preclude an individual from mailing a
firearm owned in compliance with Federal, State, and local law to a
licensed importer, licensed manufacturer, licensed dealer, or licensed
collector;
(B) this paragraph shall not be held to preclude a licensed importer,
licensed manufacturer, or licensed dealer from depositing a firearm for
conveyance in the mails to any officer, employee, agent, or watchman
who, pursuant to the provisions of section 1715 of this title, is eligible
to receive through the mails pistols, revolvers, and other firearms
capable of being concealed on the person, for use in connection with his
official duty; and
(C) nothing in this paragraph shall be construed as applying in any
manner in the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico, or any possession of the United States differently than it would
apply if the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico,
or the possession were in fact a State of the United States;
(3) for any person other than a licensed importer, licensed manufacturer,
licensed dealer, or licensed collector to transport into or receive in the
State where he resides (or if the person is a corporation or other business
entity, the State where it maintains a place of business) any firearm
purchased or otherwise obtained by such person outside that State, except
that this paragraph (A) shall not preclude any person who lawfully
acquires a firearm by bequest or intestate succession in a State other than
his State of residence from transporting the firearm into or receiving it in
that State, if it is lawful for such person to purchase or possess such
firearm in that State, (B) shall not apply to the transportation or receipt
of a firearm obtained in conformity with subsection (b)(3) of this section,
and (C) shall not apply to the transportation of any firearm acquired in
any State prior to the effective date of this chapter [effective Dec. 16,
1968];
(4) for any person, other than a licensed importer, licensed manufacturer,
166

18 USCS § 922

FIREARMS

licensed dealer, or licensed collector to transport in interstate or foreign
commerce any destructive device, machinegun (as defined in section 5845
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 [26 USCS § 5845]), short-barreled
shotgun, or short-barreled rifle, except as specifically authorized by the
Secretary consistent with public safety and necessity,
(5) for any person (other than a licensed importer, licensed manufacturer,
licensed dealer, or licensed collector) to transfei, sell, trade, give, transport, or deliver any firearm to any person (other than a licensed importer,
licensed manufacturer, licensed dealer, or licensed collector) who the
transferor knows or has reasonable cause to believe does not reside in (or
if the person is a corporation or other business entity, does not maintain
a place of business in) the State in which the transferor resides; except
that this paragraph shall not apply to (A) the transfer, transportation, or
delivery of a firearm made to carry out a bequest of a firearm to, or an
acquisition by intestate succession of a fiiearm by, a person who is permitted to acquire or possess a firearm under the laws of the State of his residence, and (B) the loan or rental of a firearm to any person for temporary
use for lawful sporting purposes,
(6) for any person in connection with the acquisition or attempted acquisition of any firearm or ammunition from a licensed importer, licensed
manufacturer, licensed dealer, or licensed collector, knowingly to make
any false or fictitious oral or written statement or to furnish or exhibit any
false, fictitious, or misrepresented identification, intended or likely to
deceive such importer, manufacturer, dealer, or collector with respect to
any fact material to the lawfulness of the sale or other disposition of such
firearm or ammunition under the provisions of this chapter [18 USCS
§§921 et seq],
(7) for any person to manufacture or import armor piercing ammunition,
except that this paragraph shall not apply to—
(A) the manufacture or importation of such ammunition for the use of
the United States or any department or agency thereof or any State or
any department agency, or political subdivision thereof,
(B) the manufacture of such ammunition for the purpose of exportation, and
(C) any manufacture or importation for the purposes of testing or
experimentation authorized by the Secretary,
(8) for any manufacturer or importer to sell or deliver armor piercing
ammunition, except that this paragraph shall not apply to—
(A) the sale or dehverv by a manufacturer or importer of such ammunition for use of the United States or any department or agency thereof
or any State or any department, agency, or political subdivision thereof,
(B) the sale or delivery by a manufacturer or importer of such ammunition for the purpose of exportation,
(C) the sale or delivery by a manufacturer or importer of such ammunition for the purposes of testing or experimenting authorized by the
Secretary, and
167

18 USCS § 922

CRIMES & CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

(9) for any person, other than a licensed importer, licensed manufacturer,
licensed dealer, or licensed collector, who does not reside in any State to
receive any firearms unless such receipt is for lawful sporting purposes.
(b) It shall be unlawful for any licensed importer, licensed manufacturer,
licensed dealer, or licensed collector to sell or deliver—
(1) any firearm or ammunition to any individual who the licensee knows
or has reasonable cause to believe is less than eighteen years of age, and,
if the firearm, or ammunition is other than a shotgun or rifle, or ammunition for a shotgun or rifle, to any individual who the licensee knows or
has reasonable cause to believe is less than twenty-one years of age;
(2) any firearm to any person in any State where the purchase or possession by such person of such firearm would be in violation of any State law
or any published ordinance applicable at the place of sale, delivery or
other disposition, unless the licensee knows or has reasonable cause to
believe that the purchase or possession would not be in violation of such
State law or such published ordinance;
(3) any firearm to any person who the licensee knows or has reasonable
cause to believe does not reside in (or if the person is a corporation or
other business entity, does not maintain a place of business in) the State
in which the licensee's place of business is located, except that this
paragraph (A) shall not apply to the sale or delivery of any rifle or shotgun
to a resident of a State other than a State in which the licensee's place of
business is located if the transferee meets in person with the transferor to
accomplish the transfer, and the sale, delivery, and receipt fully comply
with the legal conditions of sale in both such States (and any licensed
manufacturer, importer or dealer shall be presumed, for purposes of this
subparagraph, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, to have had
actual knowledge of the State laws and published ordinances of both
States), and (B) shall not apply to the loan or rental of a firearm to any
person for temporary use for lawful sporting purposes;
(4) to any person any destructive device, machinegun (as defined in section 5845 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 [26 USCS § 5845]), shortbarreled shotgun, or short-barreled rifle, except as specifically authorized
by the Secretary consistent with public safety and necessity; and
(5) any firearm or armor-piercing ammunition to any person unless the
licensee notes in his records, required to be kept pursuant to section 923
of this chapter, the name, age, and place of residence of such person if the
person is an individual, or the identity and principal and local places of
business of such person if the person is a corporation or other business
entity.
Paragraphs (1), (2), (3), and (4) of this subsection shall not apply to transactions between licensed importers, licensed manufacturers, licensed dealers,
and licensed collectors. Paragraph (4) of this subsection shall not apply to a
sale or delivery to any research organization designated by the Secretary.
(c) In any case not otherwise prohibited by this chapter [18 USCS §§ 921 et
seq.j, a licensed importer, licensed manufacturer, or licensed dealer may sell
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a firearm to a person who does not appear in person at the licensee's business premises (other than another licensed importer, manufacturer, or
dealer) only if—
(1) the transferee submits to the transferor a sworn statement in the following form"Subject to penalties provided by law, I swear that, in the case of any
firearm other than a shotgun or a rifle, I am twenty-one years or more
of age, or that, in the case of a shotgun or a rifle, I am eighteen years
or more of age, that I am not prohibited by the provisions of chapter
44 of title 18, United States Code [18 USCS §§921 et seq ], from
receiving a firearm in interstate or foreign commerce, and that my
receipt of this firearm will not be in violation ot any statute of the State
and published ordinance applicable to the locality in which I reside
Further, the true title, name, and address of the principal law enforcement officer of the locality to which the firearm will be delivered are
M
Signature
Date
and containing blank spaces for the attachment of a true copy of any
permit or other information required pursuant to such statute or published
ordinance;
(2) the transferor has, prior to the shipment or delivery of the firearm,
forwarded by registered or certified mail (return receipt requested) a copy
of the sworn statement, together with a description of the firearm, in a
form prescribed by the Secretary, to the chief law enforcement officer of
the transferee's place of residence, and has received a return receipt
evidencing deliver} of the statement or has had the statement returned
due to the refusal of the named addressee to accept such letter in accordance with United States Post Office Department [United States Postal
Service] regulations; and
(3) the transferor has delayed shipment or delivery for a period of at least
seven days following receipt of the notification of the acceptance or refusal
of delivery of the statement.
A copy of the sworn statement and a copy of the notification to the local law
enforcement officer, together with evidence of receipt or rejection of that
notification shall be retained by the licensee as a part of the iecords required
to be kept under section 923(g)
(d) It shall be unlawful for any person to sell or otherwise dispose of any
firearm or ammunition to any person knowing or having reasonable cause to
believe that such person—
(1) is under indictment for, or has been convicted in any court of. a crime
punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year,
(2) is a fugitive from justice,
(3) is an unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled substance (as
defined in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U S C 802)),
(4) has been adjudicated as a mental defective or has been committed to
any mental institution,
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(5) who, being an alien, is illegally or unlawfully in the United States;
(6) who has been discharged from the Armed Forces under dishonorable
conditions;
(7) who, having been a citizen of the United States, has renounced his
citizenship; or
(8) is subject to a court order that restrains such person from harassing,
stalking, or threatening an intimate partner of such person or child of
such intimate partner or person, or engaging in other conduct that would
place an intimate partner in reasonable fear of bodily injury to the partner
or child, except that this paragraph shall only apply to a court order
that—
(A) was issued after a hearing of which such person received actual
notice, and at which such person had the opportunity to participate;
and
(B)(i) includes a finding that such person represents a credible threat to
the physical safety of such intimate partner or child; or
(ii) by its terms explicitly prohibits the use, attempted use, or
threatened use of physical force against such intimate partner or
child that would reasonably be expected to cause bodily injury.
This subsection shall not apply with respect to the sale or disposition of a
firearm or ammunition to a licensed importer, licensed manufacturer,
licensed dealer, or licensed collector who pursuant to subsection (b) of section 925 of this chapter is not precluded from dealing in firearms or ammunition, or to a person who has been granted relief from disabilities pursuant
to subsection (c) of section 925 of this chapter.
(e) It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to deliver or cause to be
delivered to any common or contract carrier for transportation or shipment
in interstate or foreign commerce, to persons other than licensed importers,
licensed manufacturers, licensed dealers, or licensed collectors, any package
or other container in which there is any firearm or ammunition without
written notice to the carrier that such firearm or ammunition is being
transported or shipped; except that any passenger who owns or legally possesses a firearm or ammunition being transported aboard any common or
contract carrier for movement with the passenger in interstate or foreign
commerce may deliver said firearm or ammunition into the custody of the
pilot, captain, conductor or operator of such common or contract carrier for
the duration of the trip without violating any of the provisions of this chapter
[18 USCS §§ 921 et seq.]. No common or contract carrier shall require or
cause any label, tag, or other written notice to be placed on the outside of
any package, luggage, or other container that such package, luggage, or other
container contains a firearm.
(f)(1) It shall be unlawful for any common or contract carrier to transport
or deliver in interstate or foreign commerce any firearm or ammunition
with knowledge or reasonable cause to believe that the shipment, transportation, or receipt thereof would be in violation of the provisions of this
chapter [18 USCS §§921 et seq.].
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(2) It shall be unlawful for any common or contract carrier to deliver in
interstate or foreign commerce any firearm without obtaining written
acknowledgement of receipt from the recipient of the package or other
container in which there is a firearm.
(g) It shall be unlawful for any person—
(1) who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year;
(2) who is a fugitive from justice;
(3) who is an unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled substance (as
defined in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 802)):
(4) who has been adjudicated as a mental defective or who has been committed to a mental institution;
(5) who, being an alien, is illegally or unlawfully in the United States;
(6) who has been discharged from the Armed Forces under dishonorable
conditions;
(7) who, having been a citizen of the United States, has renounced his
citizenship; or
(8) who is subject to a court order that—
(A) was issued after a hearing of which such person received actual
notice, and at which such person had an opportunity to participate;
(B) restrains such person from harassing, stalking, or threatening an
intimate partner of such person or child of such intimate partner or
person, or engaging in other conduct that would place an intimate
partner in reasonable fear of bodily injury to the partner or child; and
(C)(i) includes a finding that such person represents a credible threat
to the physical safety of such intimate partner or child; or
(ii) by its terms explicitly prohibits the use, attempted use, or
threatened use of physical force against such intimate partner or
child that would reasonably be expected to cause bodily injury,
to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or
ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign
commerce.
(h) It shall be unlawful for an> individual, who to that individual's knowledge and while being emploved for an> person described in any paragraph
of subsection (g) of this section, in the course of such employment—
(1) to receive, possess, or transport anv firearm or ammunition in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce: or
(2) to receive anv firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or
transported in interstate or foreign commerce.
(0 It shall be unlawful for any person to transport or ship in interstate or
foreign commerce, any stolen firearm or stolen ammunition, knowing or
having reasonable cause to believe that the firearm or ammunition was
stolen.
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